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“Exemplary Impunity in Dantas Case”: FATF-GAFI

Source: W.A. Tupman, “Money Laundering in the EU,” online course materials, University of Exeter (undated)

A reader of Luis Nassif passes along the following unsourced report from the Belo Horizonte daily O Estado de Minas: That the Financial Action Task Force (FATF-GAFI) will take Brazil to task this year over the effectiveness of its anti-money laundering programs.

According to this article, the FATF has prepared a partial report citing the cases of Daniel Dantas, Camargo Corrêa and that champion politico-financial clusterfuck of all time, the Banestado scandal, as examples of Brazil’s inability to successfully prosecute the financial crimes.

Is that true?

I cannot find the report referred to on the FATF-GAFI Web site, but then again this report says it has not been finalized. The Web site of GAFISUD, the regional FATF-GAFI for South America, just throws a Microsoft ODBC database connectivity error over and over and over and over again.

Antonio Gustavo Rodrigues of Brazil presided over FATF-GAFI between July 2008 and June 2009 — a point of national pride in a year (fairly successfully) dedicated to boosting Brazil’s international prestige.

In the Dantas case, two developments are worth noting:

  1. A federal appeals court has finally ruled (favorably) on the constitutionality of the 2004 search warrant that resulted in the seizure of a number of hard drives from the Banco Opportunity, during a probe of alleged illegal surveillance of business competitors, government officials, and journalists.
  2. Federal investigator Protógenes Queiroz, in charge of a subsequent case, “Operation Satyagraha,” involving money laundering and bribery — on the latter count, Dantas was convicted and sentenced to 10 years in prison — may be tried in absentia on charges of fraudulent police procedure (?) and illegal surveillance.

The Estado de Minas:

A reprovação do Brasil no processo de combate à lavagem de dinheiro e financiamento ao terrrorismo pelo Grupo de Ação Financeira Internacional (Gafi), prevista para acontecer em junho, em Amsterdã, na Holanda, é inevitável e de fácil entendimento para qualquer cidadão. Levantamento do número de processos em tramitação nos Tribunais Regionais Federais deixa claro que a aplicação de punição aos réus acusados desse tipo de crime é praticamente impossível no país em razão da falta de estrutura do Judiciário para análise da ações, além de deficiências na legislação específica.

That Brazil will receive failing marks for its AML and anti-terrorist funding efforts at the FATF meeting scheduled for June in Amsterdam is a foregone conclusion, and it is easy to understand why. A study of the number of cases currently underway in the regional federal courts (TRFs) makes it clear that punishment of those accused of these crimes is practically impossible to obtain in Brazil. The judiciary lacks infrastructure to handle these cases and there are flaws in the relevant legislation.

Hoje são 60,7 mil processos em tramitação nas varas especializadas em lavagem de dinheiro, instaladas em 14 estados e no Distrito Federal, sendo que em alguns estados, como Minas Gerais, até o fim do ano passado, um único juiz era responsável pela instrução de quase 6 mil ações, ou seja, 10% do total no país.

Today there are 60,700 cases underway in the federal courts specializing in money laundering, which are present in 14 states and the federal district. In Minas Gerais, up until the end of last year, there was a single judge in charge of nearly 6,000 cases — 10% of the money laundering cases in the nation.

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Defining Progress: Humpty Dumpty Meets Plain Portuguese

Luis Nassif notes: The Folha de S. Paulo claims that the Brazilian government is “concealing data” about the Economic Growth Acceleration Program (PAC).

Source: Information provided by the PAC Web site.

The government calls bullshit.

Let’s make this a morning FactCheck.org project while waiting for the client to get their junk in gear.

Finding: The Folha de S. Paulo engages in Humpty Dumptyism while the government slips in a straw man argument.

O governo federal maquiou balanços oficiais para encobrir um mega-atraso nas principais obras do PAC. Três de cada quatro ações destacadas no primeiro balanço do programa não foram cumpridas no prazo original.

The federal government fudged official progress statements in order to cover up mega-delays in the principal projects of the PAC. Three out of four projects featured in the first progress statement of the program were not completed within the original deadline.

PT-Br Maquiar:

Michaelis:

… 2. Desfalcar, subtrair parte de: Maquiar os rendimentos do patrão …

Houaiss:

1. medir (algo) servindo-se da maquia (‘medida’)
2. cobrar ou tirar a maquia (‘remuneração’) nos lagares e moinhos
3. Derivação: sentido figurado. subtrair parte de; reduzir; Ex.: maquiou os juros para facilitar a venda (Houaiss)

That is, a maquia is a measure of grain. The verb means to collect the agreed upon price per unit measure. The figurative sense is to subtract a quantity from the standard measure, as in offering a discount. Michaelis registers the figurative sense as a synonym of robbing or defrauding — weighing with your thumb on the scales, say.

Claim: The government presented fraudulent data in order to hide “mega-delays.”

I am glad I looked that up because before, I tended to confuse the concept with maquilagem, “to apply make-up.”

The government’s response:

1. São infundadas e inaceitáveis as acusações do jornal Folha de S. Paulo (02.03.2010) a respeito do Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento (PAC).

1. The accusations of the Folha with respect to the PAC are unfounded and unacceptable.

Se existe “maquiagem” ou tentativa de “esconder” informações em relação ao PAC, ela está na reportagem do jornal, e não nos balanços periódicos do Programa.

If there was “manipulation” or an attempt to “hide” information about the PAC, it was committed by the newspaper’s article and not by the PAC’s periodic progress reports.

2. A Casa Civil da Presidência da República reitera que não há hipótese de manipulação das informações dos nove relatórios do PAC. Os balanços são transparentes e sempre foram amplamente divulgados e exaustivamente analisados pela imprensa. Tanto é assim que, a partir deles, a própria Folha pode fazer sua pesquisa e sua pauta para a elaboração da reportagem. Além disto, os dados estão disponíveis a qualquer interessado na internet – http://www.brasil.gov.br/pac

2. The Casa Civil reiterates that there is no credible evidence of manipulation of information in the nine progress reports. The reports are transparent and have always been widely distributed and closely analysed by the press. So much so that the Folha based its research and its coverage on these reports. The reports are available to any interested person on the program’s Web site.

3. Todas as alterações de cronogramas das ações do PAC estão registradas nos balanços, como, aliás, admite a própria Folha ao longo do texto: “(…) em consultas ao primeiro balanço oficial do PAC, de maio de 2007, e aos oito seguintes (…) descobre-se que muitas das obras (…) passaram por uma revisão de metas e tiveram seu prazo de conclusão dilatado…”

All the adjustments to project schedules are recorded in the progress reports, as the Folha itself admits: “… in consulting the first official progress report from May 2007 and the eight reports that followed … it is found that many of the projects … had their goals revised and their deadline extended.”

From a lazy random browse through the data on each project — the reports are easily accessible — I find numerous instances where adjustments to deadlines are explicitly stated, with an explanation for the delay.

It is true, however, that no statistical summary of projects with deadlines revised in the period is presented in the introduction.

Petrobras, which manages PAC projects in the energy sector, claims, however, that it did provide the Folha with that summary when questioned by reporters.

No primeiro balanço oficial do PAC (íntegra disponível no site do programa), há 54 obras ou ações destacadas na área de infraestrutura energética (geração e transmissão de energia elétrica, petróleo, gás natural e energias renováveis). Das que estão sob responsabilidade da Petrobras, 16 não foram concluídas nos prazos previstos no primeiro balanço oficial (lista segue abaixo).

There were 54 projects … for the energy sector … featured in the first official progress report.  Of these, 16 were not completed within the original deadline (list follows).

Of the 54 showcase projects Petrobras, 30% did not meet the original estimated date of completion.

Asked to explain the reason for these delays, the Brazilian version of Pemex explains:

Para a Petrobras, não houve atrasos, mas redefinição dos prazos, como consequência dos motivos abaixo relacionados. É preciso observar que em grande parte dos casos, a ampliação de prazo se deu em alguns meses, período inferior a um ano.

In our view, there were no delays, but rather a redefinition of deadlines for the reasons stated below. It should be noted that for the most part, the extension was a matter of months, and none longer than one year.

Petrobras goes on to explain that it used a definition based on risk of non-completion to evaluate progress.

The Folha uses an implied standard of “completion within the original estimates for time of completion.”

By that measure, the Folha could credibly argue that the original estimates have not panned out. The weatherman was wrong about no rain today.

In response, you would have to look at a sample of engineering projects on the same scale to get an index of how often prognostications of this kind are off, and by how much.

4. Os balanços do PAC sempre fizeram referência às ações desenvolvidas dentro do Programa, classificando seu andamento como “adequado”, “atenção” ou “preocupante” de acordo com os riscos apresentados à execução de cada uma.

4. PAC progress reports have always classified the progress as “adequate,” “under close observation,” or “at risk” in accordance with the risks associated with the execution of each project.

Very rough translations.

Mesmo alertada sobre esse critério objetivo, a Folha optou pelo caminho da manipulação ao selecionar uma amostra parcial de 75 ações do primeiro balanço (de um total de 1.646) para concluir, de maneira premeditada, que 75% das ações do PAC estão atrasadas. A Folha erra ao tomar o resultado de uma amostra e aplicar o percentual sobre o total de ações.

After being advised of these criteria, the Folha opted to manipulate the data, selecting a partial sample of 75 projects — the ones featured in the initial report — out of a universe of 1,646 to arrive at the foregone conclusion that 75% of PAC projects have been delayed. The Folha is wrong to apply the result of a sample to the sum total of projects.

Is that fair? What the Folha actually said:

Destaca 76 grandes obras e ações, todas com metas estabelecidas. Ao confrontar esse documento com os balanços seguintes — principalmente com o último, o de três anos do programa-, constata-se que 75% dessas obras (57) sofreram atraso no cronograma, sendo 11 delas empurradas para o próximo governo, que assume em janeiro de 2011.

The first report features 76 major projects, all with fixed objectives. Comparing this document with subsequent progress reports — and especially with the latest one, summarizing the first three years of the project — it was found that 75% of these projects (57) suffered delays, and 11 were carried over into the next government, which will assume power in January 2011.

The Folha is actually quite careful not to generalize to the entire universe of projects.

I, the Pope of Factoids, therefore declare the Folha technically sinless in this respect. Much as Clinton was technically sinless in his own sneaky little mind of hving “sex with that woman … Ms. Lewinsky.”

As Bubba would later say, “It all depends on what the meaning of ‘is’ is.” He must have read up on his G.E. Moore while doing the Rhodes Scholarship at Oxford.

I also declare the Folha‘s analysis fundamentally useless as an evaluation of the program’s overall progress, much less the real effect of any systematic fudging of the technical definition used to determined “adequacy” — which it does not even bother to explain to the reader.

Petrobras does explain the technical definition, however, speaking slowly and using words of one syllable, in its response to the Folha questionnaire, after listing the 8 types of contingency that lead to revisions of the estimated date of completion:

O carimbo de “adequado” ou “preocupante” se refere ao impacto da restrição no projeto. O que caracteriza um projeto como “adequado” é quando o atraso não inviabiliza/compromete sua operação. Um projeto “preocupante” é quando a situação põe em risco a execução de uma parte ou de todo o projeto.

The “adequate” and “at risk” seals refer to the impact of the restriction on the project. Progress is “adequate” when the delay does not render the project inviable or compromise its viability. An “at risk” project is one where part of all of the project is at serious risk of not being completed.

Now, sure, I can see the point of showing how the “green light, yellow light, red light” metaphor is overly simplistic.

I live in a country that has lived under an Amber Alert for terrorism since 2001, after all. In the first Bush term, it never once budged toward the green of world peace or the red zone of imminent apocalypse. Supporting data for the alert system is top secret eyes only. It means next to nothing.

The Brazilian government responds here, competently, with a solid number: Projects completed.

6. O fato é que das 2.471 ações monitoradas, metade foi concluída, 44% estão com ritmo adequado de execução, 5% em atenção e 1% em situação preocupante. Se metade foi concluída, como poderia haver 75% atrasadas?

The fact is that of the 2,471 projects monitored, half have been completed, 44% are showing adequate progress, 5% are flagged for closer monitoring, and 1% are at serious risk. If half have been completed, how can 75% be delayed?

And so on.

The government sneakily changes the subject from the part to the whole here in to ridicule the Folha‘s math.

In other words, the government attacks something of a straw man in accusing the Folha of generalizing from a part to the whole.

In order to refute the supposedly specious generalization, the government should produce a spreadsheet showing the overall percentage of projects with adjusted deadlines.

But saying that the program hid information — maquiou — in order to hide “mega-delays” is pure P.T. Barnum. What we Yankees call hokum. Call the bunco squad.

It assumes that all revisions of deadlines in the face of contingencies are failures.

By that same standard, the Yellow Line of the São Paulo subway is also mega-delayed, while the Rodoanel traffic interchange is tera-delayed.

Petrobras provided plenty of information on exactly what the Folha accuses of being hidden — a statistical summary of deadlines extended, with an explanation of why those projects are still considered to be showing “adequate” progress toward completion.

This is a classic case of Humpty Dumptyism, or equivocation — taking advantage of the fact that the government is following a “plain and simple Portuguese” policy so that voters who lack a Doctor of Thinkology in Heideggerian Quantum Economics from USP can play along at home.

This is why I read the Estado de S. Paulo and Valor Econômico.

They have real business and economic journalists there instead of gabbling Moonies. What is incomprehensible is that the Folha group owns a half share in Valor, but doesn’t use its journalistic resources.