«My Dear, You Must Be Joking»

João Luiz Mauad

Instituto Millenium

Translation: C. Brayton

Friday, May 31, was another in a series of terrible days for public safety in Rio de Janeiro. First, we heard reports that various police precincts had decided to “sit on their hands,” refusing to open for business. In placing dilettantism ahead of duty, these people are an example of how vast sectors of civil servants are guided, not by principles, but by the utter lack of them. Any day of the week when police precincts are shuttered — working day, weekend or holiday — is something, not from the third world, but from the fourth, the fifth, the sixth.

On the same day, another foreign tourist was severely injured during a visit to the Rocinha shantytown, in the city’s Southern Zone. The German as shot in the arm, torso and liver. He was taking a walk through the community with a friend when he was surprised by an armed man.

As soon as I read these news, I recalled a shocking article I had read the day before, in the American magazine Slate, in which reputable journalist Anne Applebaum sings  the praises of Brazil and of Rio in particular. The title and subtitle are apologetic: “Brazil’s Special Miracle – Why aren’t Brazilians more willing to promote the secrets of their success?”

In a handful of lines and with painfully shallow knowledge of our country, the author praises Brazil’s incipient entrepreneurship, its failed ethanol program, the welfare state and the Bolsa-Família, the quality of life in the favelas, the leadership of Brazil among the so-called “nonaligned” nations and the positive example Brazil should set for other poor nations.

Frankly, Anne, you must be joking.

The Death of Roberto Civita | The Man Who Would Be Murdoch

Via Brasilianas.Org

Roberto Civita has passed away.

Civita was the key figure in bringing American journalistic standards to Brazil, convincing his father to create news and information magazines.

The first of these was Realidade. According to journalists who worked with him, such as Luiz Fernando Mercadante, the young Civita had sound journalistic sense, and handled the importation of U.S. entertainment models with talent.

Sometime thereafter came Veja, copying the model of a U.S. journalism product.

The editorial standards adopted were based on those of Time. They consisted of treating news as though it were melodrama. On Monday, a planning meeting would be held in which the articles with most appeal to the readers would be selected. The issue was planned in accordance with criteria that made the news more attractive to read. Then the reporters would go out in search of quotations that confirmed the theses predefined and defended by the magazine.

Bicho + Globo + LIESA = RICO?

Source: O Globo.

RIO — Sunday, as the spotlights fell on the Special Group at the Sambadrome, an operation by state judicial police internal affairs launched 9 days ago found irregularities inside LIESA, the  League of Independent Escolas de Samba.

Entering the office of LIESA president  Jorge Castanheira, police served search and seizure warrants for evidence reflecting the participation of military police officers — among them, majors and colonels — in the provision of internal security for the festivities, contrary to a ruling by the state secretary of public safety.

Among the documents seized during Operation Finger of God II was a spreadsheet listing 37 names of security personnel hired to control access to the passarela in 2012.

At the time, state secretary Beltrame had already issued an order forbidding the involvement of police personnel in this capacity. In defiance of this rule, six colonels, five majors and a captain are listed in the document as security personnel in the employ of  MJC Eventos. The company has a services contract with Liesa and includes reserve colonel Celso Pereira de Oliveira among its partners.

O GLOBO was provided with exclusive access to some of the materials collected from Castanheira’s office. Seized at the location were two laptops, a CPU, a pen drive and a number of documents.

Give My Regards to the Big Turk

The discovery of police personnel moonlighting as Sambadrome security was not the only problem uncovered by the operation.

Among the papers seized was a handwritten letter of two pages, signed by a certain João Luis, which suggests that  the LIESA president is not exclusively busy with organizing the Carnaval parade.

The author says he is involved in a dispute with bicho banker José Caruzzo Escafura, aka Piruinha, and asks Castanheira to intercede on his behalf with bicho banker Antônio Petrus Kalil, aka The Big Turk.

Piurinha and the Rio Police

Piruinha I have heard of only in passing. The federal police union published the following anecdote.

The federal police investigations that resulted in Operation Black Op show that Haylton Carlos Escafura — the son of  José Caruzzo Escafura, a top Rio bicho banker  — relied on the protection of 10 state judicial police patrol cars during a transfer of automobiles belonging to the agency Euro Imported Cars, in Barra de Tijuca, in which he is a partner.

The security scheme was placed at the disposal of the racketeer by a ranking judicial police officer on November 24, 2010, on the eve of the invasion of the Complexo do Alemão. Wiretaps show that  Haylton was afraid that his auto agency would be targeted by rivals in the “nickel-hunter” gambling machine racket.

The intimate ties between Piruinha and state police may explain the fact that Haylton remains at large. He was one of 22 persons ordred arrested by a Federal court in October, when the federals kicked off Black Ops.

GLOBO has had access to excerpts of the wiretaps in which Piruinha’s son discusses the transfer of vehicles with Fábio Dutra Souza, his partner in the business, located on the Avenida Ministro Ivan Lins.

We, The Wise Guys

Returning to the most recent report by O Globo, and the letter leaked to it.

The author of the letter, dated 29 de setembro de 2011, begins by apologizing for pestering the LIESA president, then suggests that  Castanheira is fully aware of the rules imposed by the senior leadership of the bicho rackets of Rio.  “You and the other racketeers, with the exception of José Escafura, who for years now has not respected or enforced the rules of the mafia to which he belongs …”

Bills Were Paid by Bicho Bankers?

This was not the only connection to the bicho racket uncovered by police. During the same operation, police internal affairs, which visited another 13 addresses, discovered seven electricity bills in the name of Castanheira at a bicho operations center belonging to «Captain Guimarães». The discovery suggests that the LIESA president had his bills paid by the Captain.

Sought for comment by GLOBO, Jorge Castanheira denied any involvement with the bicho rackets and said he knows nothing about the letter discovered by police. He also denies that his electricity bills were paid for by “Captain” Guimarães.

— This proceeding is confidential. I have not had access to its content, but the press has. I cannot understand it. I have no ties to the bicho bankers. Today, I am president of LIESA, but for the last 28 years I have worked [as a general assistant]. During those years, I received a degree in economics. I receive hundreds of letters as president of LIESA, but none of them have anything to do with the bicho racket. I have nothing to do with any criminal conspiracy and I don’t know whose electricity bills these are.

Castanheira added that the only electricity bills on which his name appears are related to the offices occupied by LIESA from 1987 to 1995. Regarding the hiring of police to provide security, he said he had asked MJC to give preferential treatment to reserve officers.

Rule Applies to Police Reserves as Well

Despite what Castanheira says, reserve officers of the military police are not exempt from the disciplinary provisions of Decree 6579/83 …  According to this rule, military police must respect the police hierarchy both as current and off-duty or reserve police agents. Thus, Beltrame’s decree applies to retired PMs as well.

The public safety secretary said that it is looking into the irregular provision of services by its personnel during Carnaval. In a note, the department said that since 2008, more than 1,393 state judicial and military police have been expelled by the three internal affairs departments … for various misdeeds.

Finger of God II grew out of an analysis of data obtained during Finger of God I in December 2011. During the second phase, starting on 31 January 2012, the police applied for arrest warrants for bicho bankers Capitão Guimarães and Luiz Pacheco Drumond, aka Luizinho Drumond, both of them former  Liesa presidents.

Their warrant applications were not granted, however.

LIESA, The Untouchable Monopoly

Why not? This is the question that demands an answer when it comes to understanding how for nearly 18 years LIESA has dominated Carnaval in Rio from start to finish, from lighting to ticket sales, from the sound system to every other aspect of the festivities.

Including broadcast rights, which LIESA has ceded to the Globo network despite the best efforts of the state legislature to put an end to its rein.

Bicho + Globo + LIESA = RICO?

I posted a note on that general topic in 2007.

• Rio: “Why Does Globo Monopolize Carnival?”

Historically linked to the bicho numbers racket, LIESA has monopolized the organized Carnaval celebration since 1995. Year in and year out, promises of a competitive public auction have failed to pan out.

Rio mayor Eduardo Paes scheduled such an auction on various occasions and succeeded in conducting one for 2010, but the proposal as passed failed to meet certain requirements of the TCM, the city accounting tribunal.

This year, as I noted recently, TCM justices lost their free access to a Sambadrome sky box on the grounds that the justices should not be benefiting from a contract on which they will eventually have to pronounce judgment.

Unlike what the bicho bankers claimed, the terms as stated were not valid; the auction would have to be redone, but there was not enough time left. Thus did Carnaval 2011 fall back into the hands of LIESA.

Last year, alleging lack of competition in the auction for Carnaval 2009, a Rio court froze the assets of former mayor  Cesar Maia, who hired LIESA R$ 5.3 million.

And therein lies another tale.

Bovespa 750 | Priming the Pump

Source: Infomoney, via Fusões & Aquisições.

The story is essentially a Ctl-C Ctl-V of prepared talking points from its principal source – a source worth paying attention to, however.

The listing of more and more small and medium enterprises could help BM&F-Bovespa improve its ranking from 26th position currently — one place below the Mongolian Stock Exchange.

BM&F-Bovespa currently lists 353 companies, which makes the Brazilian stock market the 26th largest in the world. The market’s own estimates suggest that a number of companies are waiting for the best moment in which to launch their IPO, but it is not impossible to assume that small and medium enterprises — SMEs — are also waiting for the right moment to list their shares.

The creation of a healthy capital market is a practical necesssity for the growth of a capitalist economy. It was to promotion of these conditions that PAC-PME — a growth acceleration program for SMEs — has been dedicated, in an effort to create the dynamic conditions necesary to economic growth.

The movement, subscribed by such heavy hitters as Itaú Unibanco (ITUB4), Bradesco (BBDC4), Banco do Brasil (BBAS3), BTG Pactual (BBTG11), FIESP , MBC (Movimento Brasil Competitivo), PwC and Deloitte, seeks to make it easier for SMEs to list their shares, raise capital, and grow and develop, contributing to economic growth in general.

“Bovespa could have 750 listed companies and cease to be a pitiful exchange. Currently, we are the 7th largest economy in the world, but our exchange occupies 26th place, with only 353 listed companies. Access to the capital markets is completely out of reach [to many companies],”says Rodolfo Zabisky, CEO of @ttitude, the largest independent investor relations company in the world.

@ttitude is the parent company of The MZ Group — a S. Paulo-based international IR agency with a near monopoly on multilingual IR services, from 10-Ks and 13-Ds to ADRs and Material Events. 

Brazil | Building Out the Culture Industrial Complex

 

Source: Estado de S. Paulo »  Portal ClippingMP.
By: Sonia Racy
Translation: C. Brayton

Marcos Prado speaks out about the difficulties of producing films in Brazil, the challenges of distribution, and what comes next.

As the Oscars approach, Mar­cos Prado laments the rarity of Brazilian films among the nominees. Why does Brazil produce such a small number of films?

“I have no precise answer to these questions, but I know from experience how difficult it is to produce movies here,” says Prado, producer of the two Elite Squad films, the celebrated documentary Estamira, and the feature-length Artifical Paradises.

Is it a matter of inadequate marketing? “We lack domestic marketing, as well as strategies for foreign markets and government support,” Prado says.

While awaiting the results of Oscar night, Prado spoke to this column about what he says are exciting new projects.  The following are selections from that interview. .

After Paraísos Artifi­ciais | Artificial Paradises, what is your next project?

I will direct a film called Nó na Garganta | A lump in the throat – about football hooligans. We have already applied to BNDES and are raising other funds. Our budget is R$ 10 million.

We want to show why these young men identify so passionately with their team, their intense way  of life. There is a warlike aspect to this. I want to explore this underworld, which, while it generally involves young men of a more inferior social status, also attracts middle class youth to football violence. We are trying to understand, not to justify or to judge.

Any other projects on the way?

We are working on a screenplay on the life of Brazilian jiu-jitsu master Rickson Gracie — a story about his life, not about fighting, however.

We also plan a film about the invasion of the Morro do Alemão shantytown complex in Rio de Janeiro. Both will be directed by Zé Padilha. The film about the shantry we are provisionally calling The Invasion of the Alemão. The plot will deal with a book by Rodrigo Pimentel and Gustavo Almeida, to be published this year.

Invasion of the Alemão is a play on words: alemão is slang for the military police. Pimentel is a former military police captain and author of the novel Tropa de Elite.

Also emerging from our Pandora’s box: a TV series based on Elite Squad. We are still negotiating with channels interested in airing it.

Neuza was commenting just the other day that Brazil is in the initial stages of a migration from the ever popular novela — soap opera — to U.S. style one-hour dramatic series and half-hour situational comedies.

How did you and Padilha start working together?

We were always fast friends. Padilha was working in a bank. One day, he said to me: “Brother, the Age of Collor has let me down.”I answered: “Not me!”

Of course, the difference was that I had no savings to be confiscated, I was flat broke anyway! And then he told me he had long wanted to make documentaries, as I had been doing for quite some time, He proposed a documentary on coal miners. We eventually wound up make Elite Squad.

Was Elite Squad originally planned as a documentary?

It was, but we wound up producing a fiction because we could not find a way to document what goes inside the police forces. You cannot just sit there interviewing the talking head. That is boring. So Zé spent two years working on the screenplay. And it worked out well. .

Does Ancine work?

It works, but it is a bit slow and rigid.

And what about BNDES?

It helps.And there are other incentives as well, but all of them are expensive. The Brazilian film industry cannnot  become a true industry under the current rules governing Brazilian cinema.

Is it hard to arrange financing for films here in Brazil?

It is not easy. Ancine regulates the movie industry and limits the extent of federal subsidies to  R$ 7 million. There are also state and municipal incentives, which raise this ceiling some, but not very much. The problem is that this level of funding is too low for more ambitious productions.

Brazilian directors are beginning to work overseas. Padilha, for example.

They are going abroad because this is a dream they dream of fulfilling.  Padi­lha is becoming a director well known to the gringo audience and as a result will have more artistic freedom in the future. He is currently making a US$ 100 million film, Robocop 4. He has little artistic freedom, however..

In raising funds through the Rouanet Law, the maximum tax-free donation is R$7 million?

Correct. R$ 3 million of these  R$ 7 million go to distributors — the vast majority  of them subsidiaries of foreign companies. They are allowed by law to reinvest the percentage of box office receipts they would ordinarily remit to their parent company. Exercising this right, they become co-producers. For example: I am a film distributor,  I find myself interested in your project, and so I invest in your film, but only after you sign a contract with me. In this way, I have to give up the portion of the film rights that belong to me.

So that means that onlyh R$4 million in funding is available?

More or less, because this arrangement with the distributors is a common practice virtually everywhere in Brazil. And so you realize that you end up losing more and more of the own rights to your own film. A lot of producers also have to cede rights to investors and others.

For example: if you make a film without the participation of Globo Filmes, your film never gets launched. And so you concede 20% of your own rights and now, because 50% of ticket sales belong to the exhibitors, there is very little left of your share.

Producers have no way of making money off of Brazilian film productions.

On the rise of Globo Filmes, via Wikipedia:

In 1997, in a bid to enter the film industry, the Globo organizations created their own production company, Globo Filmes, a company that sought to rebrand all sectors of the national film industry. In a very short time, Globo Filmes would grow into a major monopoly that ruled the Brazilian film industry. Although its movie division was initially miniscule when measured against its TV networks, Globo successfully entered one of the culture industry’s most important niches, a niche it had never entered before.

Between 1998 and 2003, Globo was directly involved in 24 film productions and its supremacy in this area was definitively established in late 2003, when films produced by Globo Filmes took in 90% of the national box office earned by Brazilian films and 20% of all films exhibited in Brazil, foreign and domestic.

Brazilian box office sales for 2012. Disney leads the way, as it often does.

Is there any way out?

A lot of producers take it out of the salaries …  Along comes Ancine and says you are not allowed to do that. So you have to run an obstacle course to find some way to secure your funding. This is just plain wrong. The film industry has to be able to survive without resorting to such subterfuges.  But it’s not easy.

Did you distribute Elite Squad yourself?

Yes, we did, and we structured the finance in order to receive 70%. We set up a distribution company, called Nossa, in partnership with Conspiração, O2, Lereby and others involved in the industry.  The market liked the structure we came up with and market players cooperated on the creation of an option. The only problem is that this requires the producer to invest in the launch of the film, which the Rouanet law does not permit.  We are trying to reinvent a formula that would allow Brazilian cinema to become an economically viable industry.

What do you think of the competition between DVDs and movie houses?

Movie houses are declining, that much is true. The more purchasing power and technological savvy people have, the more they watch films at home. Still, the principal source of a producer’s income comes from ticket sales.

Government statistics on the market are optimistic, but quotas favoring national and international produtions seem to be slow to respond — judging the diet offered by our own cable TV operator.

The Brazilian movie market is the most vigorous of all the art forms. In 2011, according to an Ancine report, …  some 143.9 million tickets were sold and the gross revenue of movie box office was R$ 1.44 billion, both of them new national records that situate Brazil among the most important markets in the world.

Tickets sold represents a good deal less than one Brazilian per session.  U.S. box office for 2012 was 1.54 billion, or let us call it 5 movie tickets per capita.

“The number of feature-length films launched — 99 — was the highest in the last decade,. says  Ancine executive director Manoel Rangel. After the market began growing again in the 1990s, the Brazilian film industry has consolidated itself. The aesthetic values of its  productions and its alternative cinema are heating up. Competition remains fierce, of course. There were no Brazilian films among the box office champtions in  2012.

Brazilian cinema attendance ranks 13th in the world, with 80,000,000 tickets sold per annum, according to NationMaster. It also ranks 13th in films produced, with 81.

Brazil has 2,098 cinemas, half of them located in the Southeast.

The U.S. slipped to 5,697 in 2011 and has declined steadily since 1995, when it fielded 7,744.

Above: The Brazilian mass market suggests that very few national films obtain Hollywood levels of box office success at home.

Listings to the Left | Carta Capital Under Fire

Source: Comunique-se

Carta Capital magazine stands accused by the state’s attorney of Minas Gerais of forging a document used to illustrate articles on the so-called «monthly payola of the PSDB» … The infraction alleged by the magazine was supposedly committed during the reelection campaign of Minas governor Eduardo Azeredo (PSDB) in 1998.

Isto É magazine — above — also reported on documentary evidence in the case, in a September cover story The document in question is sometimes called the «Lista de Mourão» after its mentor, Cláudio Roberto Mourão da Silveira.

In a press release, the state prosecutor states that “on December 3 of 2012, the editors of Carta Capital were served with Notice No. 108/2012-SCI-PGJ, informing the magazine’s senior editors of the falsehood of information published in the article in question, “Return to the origins,” in the November 14 edition.

The article, written by Leandro Fortes, states that the former governor and current federal deputy withdrew more than R$100 million from state-owned firms and passed the funds to politicians and judges, most of them linked to the PSDB,  as well as to media companies.

The list included the name of Supreme Court justice Gilmar Mendes, former presidente Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Goiás governor Marconi Perillo (PSDB).

According to Fortes, this scheme to skim money from the public coffers was much worse than the «monthly payola» of the PSDB’s rival, the PT.

“For those who have watched the trial in the Supreme Court, with its innovative doctrine of «de facto dominion» and its guilty verdicts based on subjective intuitions, the «Toucan payola» will prove even more shocking thanks to the presence of something sorely lacking in the current case: inequivocal and decisive proof.

Dominio do fato is a controversial legal doctrine under which hierarchical superiors can be held responsible for bad acts by subordinates, even when demonstrably unaware of such acts For instance, the central player in the «PT payola» scheme was found guilty without any evidence of bad acts on his part. The judges reasoned that given his position, he must have or should have known of the scheme. The German legal scholar who authored the concept has appeared in a handful of interviews questioning its use in this case.

Coordinator of CAORIM, the Center for the Operational Support of Criminal Prosecutors, Joaquim José Miranda Júnior filed a police report with the Belo Horizonte Forgery and Fraud division, charging CC with journalistic fraud, The state’s attorney of Minas Gerais claims the document bears a forged signature of prosecutor Adriano Estrela, suggesting that the underlying sources of the story were “forged” and “inauthentic.”

On holiday, Leandro Fortes told Comunique-se he knows nothing about the accusation by the MP-MG.

Jornal da Mídia adds:

The lista … was produced by a known forger, who did jail time long before creating the list in question. The document is registered in the notary office and its signatures notarized. It contains gross errors, such as describing the alleged beneficiaries as holding offices they would not hold until several years after the registered date of the “document.”

Carta Capital replies immediately with the following op-ed.

I have been reading here and there that the Minas Gerais prosecutor is accusing this magazine of forging documents in the case of the «Toucan payola. I repeat: we have been accused by the MP of creating and publishing false documents from a law suit, according to reports on the Internet. The author of this serious accusation will have to back his words with evidence in a court of law.

As to the Web sites that hastened to spread this “information,” without contacting us for comment, I would like to repeat that CC does not publish police records or forged documents, does not accuse without evidence to back it, does not transform corrupt politicians into paragons of public morality  does not transform a wadded up piece of paper into a brick, does not associate with racketeers like Carlinhos Cachoeira and does not use the services of black bag, private-sector intelligence operators — who have become the true “investigative reporters” of Brasília.

The pejorative description reflects Mino Carta’s contempt for the contemporary Veja magazine, a magazine he founded in mid-1968.

The reference to a wadded-up piece of paper refers to a political propaganda set piece used during the last presidential election. Passing through a poorer  neighborhood in Rio, the candidate was struck on the head by a wadded-up flier thrown by a union member.

The mainstream press turned the incident into an exemplar of how vicious and violent government supports are. It really was absurd, and yielded quickly to online mockery.

We do not belong to this club, and this attempt to lump us with in the others is pathetic  We do not practice the journalism of the sewers.

As to the  «Toucan payola» document, like the Furnas list before it, it is once again self-evident how much political power is being brought to bear on the effort to undermine its credibility.

This time around, however, the participation of the MP of Minas is impressive. The  Furnas List was also described as a phony. Former governor Azeredo continues to use this argument — that the list is a forgery — in response to documents that describe how the «pipeline» operated in his back yard.

One faction of the “fair and independent media” simply parrots Azeredo to see if it can make the forgery theory stick. But a report by the federal police criminalistic lab has proven that the list was not tampered with and that the signatures are authentic.

The report by Leandro Fortes, as usual, was based on documents received from trusted sources, including participants in the lab experiments that ripened into the slush fund laundering scheme developed for the PSDB by  Marcos Valério de Souza, later used by the PT. We are absolutely confident in our reporting..

The original report ran in Issue No. 723,, November 11, 2012.

Furnas List

Mourão List

Brasília | Oligopolies Under Observation in 2013

Oligopolies in the Media Market

Source: Folha de S. Paulo | Brasilianas.Org.
By: Vladimir Safatle
Translation: C. Brayton

In recent weeks, Argentina made fresh headlines in Brazil with stories on clashes over the enforcement of Argentina’s so-called “Media Law,” which defines a new regulatory order for companies in the news and entertainment sectors.

Some of these new provisions, and especially those related to combating monopolies, have been viewed as signs of a vengeful State intent on limiting freedom of expression, as in the case of the archrivalry between President Kirchner and the Clarín group.

Leaving aside these heated public conflicts, however, the Argentines are engaged in an important debate that deserves to be treated more dispassionately. It seeks an answer to the question: “Do we or do we not need laws that restrict the concentration of ownership in the media sector?” That is to say, can we successfully argue that concentrated media ownership does not necessarily affect democratic practices?

At this juncture, it is worthwhile remembering that the global media market is currently among the most oligopolized in the world.

What is more, as we gather from  reading between the lines of the recent case involving Rupert Murdoch, this state of affairs really does affect our political life.

Murdoch built an empire of TV stations, newspapers, magazines, radio stations, book publishers, movie theater chains, and Internet portals that gave him the ability to mold debate, pressure governments and interfere in politics to the extent that it promised the American general  David Petraeus its unlimited support should he choose to run for U.S. president.

Situations like this are not exclusive to the Anglo-Saxon world, however. Recent decades have witnessed a brutal, highly negative trend toward consolidation of the sector that affects not only our politics but also our culture.

A single group like Time Warner, for example, exercises simultaneous control over production, distribution and development of new techniques. In this case, we are justified in saying that laws barring the formation of oligopolies is a way for society to defend itself against the coerced uniformity of opinion and the silencing of alternative voices.

Opponents of this viewpoint might reply that a more fragmented market would leave media companies more vulnerable to government pressure. This argument is not without merit.

The solution to this aspect of the problem, however, is not the perpetuation of the other aspect. Strategies are needed in order to prevent governments from framing the news according to their own interests.

In Brazil, this would imply limiting government influence by drastically cutting spending on government advertising — which should be confined to public service announcements — and enforcing laws such as the ban on politicians owning media outlets. Clear and absolutely fair criteria for the use of publicity budgets by state-owned firms should be developed.

São Paulo’s state-owned and publicly traded Sabesp might make an interesting case in point. It frequently walks the corda bamba between public service announcements and government propaganda, as is “this is your current government at work for you.”

But this could be an artifact of my own subjective impression as a couch potato. This might make a good little feature article to research.

Where are all the Sabesp TV spots stored? What PR techniques do they apply? Do they amount to the use of public money to promote a specific administration?

Anyway, I have always thought that the «monthly payola» cases should be combined and subjected to a parliamentary commission of inquiry — CPI — of the PR industry at the heart of these and other scandals.

After all, the exact same mechanism was used in several of these cases: Publicity services were contracted by a state or municipal government for a given cultural or sporting event — Rock in Rio, an Enduro motorcycle event in Minas Gerais — and then publicity fees were accounted for as having been paid to fictional or purpose-built Potemkin village PR outsourcers.

In fact, however, most of these PR funds were skimmed off for use by political and private parties. Enter the hidden camera video of political operators stuffing their socks and jocks with bundles of cash and you have yourself a classic Brazilian “mountain of money” scandal.

In any event, big PR has a demonstrated capacity for financial legerdemain — think of Duda Mendonça as well as Marcos Valério. Perhaps the second most common source of laundered campaign money: state-owned companies like Furnas in Minas Gerais.

The Vanguard of the Obsolete

Gilberto Maringoni e Verena Glass of the IPEA provide a detailed historical narrative of media law development in Latin America, explaining why regulation produced in the 1930s-1960s no longer applies.

Another factor that could not have been anticipated was the invention of digital technology and the deterritorialization of media companies through the use of virtual networks.

Before the digital revolution (1980- 90) news organizations had to be located in the country where they operated. This was not merely an arbitrary legal requirement, based on nationalist developmentalism. At this time, the entire network of businesses, and especially in the advertising sector and media finance, was anchored in calmer waters.

Now, however, an ISP, Web portal or cable TV provider can transmit content from any part of the world, without having to use antennae or sophisticated broadcast equipment.

The main problem is that the ISPs and cable operators are not classifiable as content and information producers as defined by the current, outmoded legislation.

The privatization of Latin American telecoms in the 1980s-90s, opened up a veritable  Pandora’s box. State-owned telephone monopolies were auctioned off. It may be that the authorities who sponsored this policy were blind to the about-face that would make possible a state of borderless media convergence.

Telephone operators, for example, which during the 1990s were limited to long distance voice communication, underwent a consolidation that two decades later would turn them into the biggest Internet providers in Brazil and arm them with the same political firepower as any traditional TV network.

As things stand, TV, radio, telephone, film, literature, music, data transmission, navigation data and many other services can be tapped using nothing more than a single smartphone.  Each of these functions, however, must still comply with rules specific to its sector.

ISPs use technology to produce and distribute content. To the extent that they are not subject to the old legal norms, their content can be produced anywhere in the world and transmitted to any other, with adjustments made for local characteristics [such as  language].

At the same time, now that global media maintains offices in many different countries, a complex series of loopholes in current local laws has been used to legitimate the local operation.

From the same symposium,, Denis de Moraes:

Brazil is in the  vanguard of obsolescence [sic] in terms of its regulation of the media. Its radio and TV regulator remains one of the most outmoded in Latin America. To date, the congress has made no progress toward regulating Articles 220 and 221 of the 1988 Constitution, which respectively ban monopolies in the mass media and gives preferential treatment to TV and radio stations “serving education, artistic, cultural and informative ends,” as well as “the promotion of national and regional culture and a plan of stimuli to independent productions who qualify. .The lack of action by successive governments in this area is just plain alarming.

Media a Priority for 2013

The president of the ruling PT has said that political reform and media regulation are the top priorities of this year’s Congress. The quote is from November of last year.

Rui Falcão said his party has at least two goals for 2013: A new regulatory framework for the media and political reform.

The party will begin to execute its strategy — calling on the federal president to issue a bill that regulates the media —  the party will include the issue in its agenda for the meeting of the national leadership.

Last week, Falcão told the international press that he hopes the presidency will send down a bill regulating communications in Brazil. “It is not our party that wants to pass enabling legislation for these provisions of the Constitution, it is the congress as a whole. We hope that our government will send down a bill establishing a regulatory framework that will increase freedom of expression and eliminate any possibility of censorship of the established media, regulating provisions in the Constitution that have yet to get off the drawing board.”

Opus Dei & The Mistress of Lula

PCdoB journalist Altamiro Borges complains of a disinformation scheme designed to spread false rumors about the former Brazilian president.

Borges is probably right: the digital strategy and the rhetorical tactics in play here are similar to those used by Vlademiro Montesino and J. J. Rendón to assassinate the character of targeted adversaries in Peru and Colombia, respectively.

It gets so that you can start to recognize campaigns of this kind by recognizing its playbook..

In an article published on December 10 in the Estado de S. Paulo, journalist and consultant Carlos Alberto Di Franco, a founder and senior leader of the fascist sect Opus Dei in Brasil, reinforces arguments in favor of the recent crusade against ex-President Lula.

In doing so, he does not hesitate for a single moment to use arguments of a moral nature — the typical ploy of phony moralists.

In his editorial, which calls for an end to the privacy of public figures, di Franco states that it can no longer be concealed that Rosemary Noronha, former chief of staff of the presidency in São Paulo, was ”Lula’s lover.”

Facts not in evidence. There is actually very little coverage of the fact assumed but not in evidence here: That a long-time Lula aide and the ex-president were romantically involved.

The Estado had written a leak-based story about

• E-mails demonstrate proximity of Lula to aide

   

The ESP does not, however, draw a single conclusion about the nature of the relationship between the two. It writes,

The federal police recorded  122 phone calls between the ex-president and Rose between March  2011 and October 201, according to a story reported by the daily Metro. There were 5 such calls a day on average.

Based on a quick googled tour through the turbulent waters of this meme, the impetus of the rumor appears comes from heavy, SEO-enhanced blogging by the likes of Veja. Augusto Nunes leads the way.

Di Franco relies on such sources to reason consistently as though the love-affair trope were established fact:

Frequently insinuated in the press coverage of the case, the love affair between  Rosemary Nóvoa de Noronha, former presidential chief of staff for São Paulo, and her former boss,  Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva has finally been brought out into the open in a recent edition of the Folha de S.Paulo: «Aide’s power flowed from initimate relation with Lula», ran the front-page headline.

Journalist Suzana Singer, ombudsman of the Folha, provided a fitting analysis  of the case: While avoiding the term “lover,” the Folha reported on the 23 international events in which Rosemary accompanied Lula, whose wife never came along. According to the Folha, a special scheme was in place that gave Rose access to the presidential suite during these visits. It was a relationship going back 19 years, to when  she was a bank union member and he a defeated presidential candidate. “Did the Folha invade the privacy of Lula? Yes. Did it need to? Yes.” I agree whole-heartedly with Suzana’s analysis.

Not entirely. Singer recommends giving the story its proper weight and notes that the facts assumed as evidence by Di Franco are unproven. She writes:

The work is not finished yet. It was relevant to show the reader where Rosemary acquired her influence, but from here on out, bedroom episodes, tempting as they are, and not interesting any longer.

What matters is to investigate whether Lula was involved in an alleged influence-peddling scheme created by his aide.

If nothing is found, it is time to let the small fish go … and focus attention on the major companies investigated in the Porto Seguro case. As Deep Throat advised to Woodstein, “Follow the money.”

Unlike U.S. papers, for example, the Brazilian press tends to spare the private life of public personalities. The hijinks of ex-presidents Juscelino Kubitschek and João Figueiredo were well-known and often discussed among journalists of the day,

The same might be said of the press in its relation to  Fernando Henrique Cardoso, who had a son out of wedlock. The media knew about the affair but chose to remain silent. The incident was reported by the Folha de S.Paulo when Cardoso, now a widower and ex-president, recognized the boy as his own. Such episodes can therefore be “interesting” to the public — they awaken curiosity — without speaking to “the public interest.” Public funds were not involved.   All of these episode could be considered “interesting” to the public — they provoke curiosity — but not necessarily “in the public interest.”

The Lula case is quite different. Polícia Federal say that Rosemary was able, among other things, to place corrupt friends in the federal government and that these friends sold technical certifications and legal opinions favorable to certain business owners.

While still president, Lula — although he may not have been aware of the fact –afforded favors to the group led by Rose, who used her influence to name the brothers Paulo and Rubens Vieira to direct the National Water Agency  (ANA) the National Civil Aviation Agency (ANAC). Once inside the government, the brothers sold favors to business owners whose fate depended on federal action.

Rose, boasting of her intimate relation with Lula, exerted  influence over the Banco do Brasil (BB). She lobbied for the appointment of BB CEO Aldemir Bendine and nominated bank directors.

How was it possible for the former PT secretary to accumulate such power, to the point of touching upon such extremely sensitive questions?  All of this is unquestionably a matter of public interest, and received the proper profile thanks to the work of the press.

These facts alone would be sufficient to invade the privacy of ex-president Lula. The right to privacy cannot be used to impeded a criminal investigation and the publication of facts of significant public interest. …

Di Franco goes on — and on, and on — to compare the current state of  Brazilian journalism with the Republican ideas of Rui Barbosa.  I skip over that part.

The ideas of Rui Barbosa and the current customs of Brazilian public life could not be farther apart. Important journalistic information is often considered abusive or absurd. … public figures invoke the right to privacy as a means to escape from public scrutiny, but as I see it, that right is not absolute. … Aspects of private life affecting the public interest in a prominent figure should not be censored on grounds of right to privacy.

But  should they not be banned from publication for being untrue or unproven? I want to hear genuine pillow talk between Lula and Rose before I buy into this cockeyed theory.

There can be no schizophrenia between private and public life. Actions performed  in private may be predictors of conduct in the public sphere. The reader and the voter have the right to know what these are. …  And there is private information  – the  Rose-Lula love affair is is emblematic — involving both private and public information. The press has not only the right but the duty to invade the private life of the public man. It is a clear case of the public interest.

Borges saves his big guns for the alleged influence of Opus Dei over the current scandal. It is a fact, on the record, that di Franco is an Opus Dei prelate and spiritual adviser to the S. Paulo state governor, Alckmin.

The leader of this shadowy sect believes Lula should have his personal life completely open to the media.  …

 Now that he is so concerned with transparency, the Opus Dei leader might agree to reveal its own masochistic and medieval practices, and who among politicians, judges and journalists are its members. What sort of masses are said in the Governor’s Palace with  Geraldo Alckmin? How did this organization participate in the 1964 coup? As di Franco himself says, “there is information on private life that demonstrate a direct relationship between the public and the private.

7D | A Mexican Standoff?

On 7D, nothing will happen

Argentine media group Clarín announces a stay of execution.

It says it will not be required to comply with the 2009 Ley dos Medios until all appeals have been exhausted.

As soon as [the court] extended the stay in the case challenging the constitutionality of certain provisions of the media law, Clarín issued the following statement:

The Grupo Clarín has just been informed that the injunction has been extended until a definitive ruling on the constitutionality of provisions of the Media Law  has been arrived at.

As it has throughout the process,  Grupo Clarín will follow the law, respecting the Constitution, the law, and the findings of the courts.

Eric Nepomuceno of Brazil’s Observatório da Imprensa summarizes the case, below.

As it happens, and contrary to the image of a deeply polarized debate, there is internal disagreement among shareholders in the Clarín group over compliance — I will translate that, too. But first,

The Gospel According to Cachoeira | Carlinhos and The Twelve Disciples

Journalists working off the books  in the furtherance of a racketeering influenced corrupt organization: the final report of a bicameral congressional commission of inquiry due out this week dedicates 349 pages to the issue, according to Exame magazine.

Some 85 páginas of this chapter in one report are dedicated to Policarpo Júnior, Veja bureau chief, who is the target of an indictment for criminal conspiracy.  Policarpo is the author of accusations against former presidential chief of staff José Dirceu and reporting on a corruption scheme  in the Transportation Ministry. Federal police wiretaps show that the editor spoke often with Cachoeira about information used in investigations.

Policarpo is described as a “journalist eager and willing to carry out the racketeer’s wishes.” Concerning a conversation between the two in which Policarpo asks Cachoeira to “dig up some dirt” on federal deputy  Jovair Arantes (PTB-GO), Cunha suggests that the editor is requesting illegal surveillance or some other illegal form of investigation.” At another point, he cites a request by Waterfall that a certain note be published in a column in the magazine. The e-mail was sent, but the text was not published..

Veja magazine continues to mount a vigorous defense – «it was mere bad journalism, not criminal behavior» –  which we will get to. But first, the tale of Cachoeira and the 12 disciples.

Source: Observatório da Imprensa
By:Najla Passo
Partial translation: C. Brayton

Since CPMI rapporteur Odair Costa (PT) announced that he would request the indictment of five journalists in his final report in the Cachoeira case, the press and the opposition have been howling in unison about a supposed affront to freedom of expression and an attempt at revenge by the PT government, against those who attacked the party over the “monthly payola” case.

Documents contained in the final report show journalists selling services or space in their publications, and in doing so helping an acknowledged criminal organization to achieve its criminal ends.

Or short of that, forming an association to destroy common enemies of the criminal plot and the publication.

Veja magazine’s bureau chief in Brasília, Policarpo Junior is the best-known player on this team.

But the group is much larger than Policarpo.