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I Spy on Paraguay | News of a Recruitment

Carteira-da-ABIN-falsa

Phony ABIN ID card from an unrelated incident: «Expert in Electronic Warfare Level III»

Source: Congresso em Foco.

Brazil dismisses agent suspected of passing data to the CIA

Even as the U.S. NSA kept an eye on targets in the Rousseff government, Brazil fired an agent of its own secret service who is suspected of have passed secrets to the CIA.

Analyst No. 008997 of the Brazilian Intelligeence Agency (Abin), a ranking official who had run the ABIN office in Foz do Iguaçu, was allegedly coopted by an American agent who was sheltered under the mantle of a diplomatic post in the U.S. Embassy in Brasília. The U.S. was looking for data on national policy for the Triple Frontier (Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay) and on Brazilian government informants in the region. … kept a lid on the case …

Abin did not bring administrative charges against the agent in order to spare the agency the embarrassment. It is feared that the U.S. spy may have obtained a list of informants infiltrated into the Arab community along the Triple Frontier.

The Estado de S. Paulo was first to get the story, as usual.

Members of the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (Abin) fear that the American spy who maintained contact with Brazilian Agent No. 008997 may have obtained a list of informants infiltrated into the significant Arab community of the Triple Frontier. 

The region around Foz do Iguaçu is considered by the U.S. as a financial center through which funds are passed to terrorist groups in the MiddleEast. The collection of informants is the “patrimony” of the secret service. Many are paid by Abin and their identities kept secret, even from allies. 

Sought for comment on Friday night, the U.S. Embassy limited itself to saying that the agent identified by Abin during encounters with the Brazilian spy really does work in Brasília, but has now returned to the States.

We are refraining from naming the agent in question on the recommendation of Abin analysts consulted by the Estado, who cited the Intelligence Identity Protection Act of 1982. Although it does not apply outside the U.S., American law can be used against those involved in other circumstances. 

At the Ministry of Foreign Relations, the registration shows that the American was in Brazil between September 29, 2010 and August 12, 2012, where he was assigned to the embassy. This means that he left Brazil just a week after his encounter with the ex-Abin agent.

Sought for comment, Abin said in note that “we do not comment publicly on the exercise of intelligence activities.”

After numerous attempts, OESP was no able to local the retired agent No. 008997.

O Gabinete de Segurança Institucional (GSI), a quem a Abin é subordinada, não quis se pronunciar, alegando que a resposta já havia sido dada pela agência. Não houve explicação, no entanto, sobre o motivo pelo qual o ministro-chefe do GSI, general José Elito, assinou a exoneração do agente 008997 da Superintendência de Manaus, primeiro passo para a aposentadoria dele, sem que tenha sido aberta uma sindicância ou um processo administrativo contra o servidor. Elito teria sido informado pelo diretor da Abin, Wilson Trezza, do verdadeiro motivo da exoneração.

A atitude da direção da Abin de ignorar a suspeita de espionagem revoltou setores da contrainteligência do órgão, que havia desbaratado toda a operação, já que o trabalho levou à aposentadoria compulsória do agente brasileiro e a transferência imediata do americano.

O fato de as autoridades encarregadas de detectar ações de espionagem no País terem omitido da presidente Dilma Rousseff o “grave episódio” foi considerado sério, segundo uma das fontes ouvidas pelo Estado.

Nas discussões na direção da Abin, prevaleceu a tese de que, como o Brasil não tem legislação tipificando crime de espionagem e a inteligência não produz provas, seria difícil enquadrar os envolvidos, apesar de a própria contrainteligência da Abin ter gravações em vídeo do jantar e fotos da conversa entre os dois, ocorrida em agosto de 2012, em Curitiba.

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